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Water in Nairobi: Unveiling 
inequalities and its causes
Martin Ledant1
Water and Sanitation in Nairobi face problem common to many cities of 
the developing world which grow too fast. The water supply is unable to meet 
fast growing demand. Water is unreliable even to the small majority who has 
direct connection to tapped water. For those who cannot get enough, reliance 
on alternative unregulated service suppliers is a necessity, but these practice 
prices which are much higher than the legal rate. For those with the means, 
investment in storage tanks helps harvesting more water at the expense of 
everyone else in the community. This situation allows the stark differences in 
socio-economic between the wealthy and the poor to translate into unequal 
and inequitable consumption of the available water (Bakker, 2007). How deep 
is the gap between the serviced and the water-starved? How strong is water 
inequality in Nairobi (map 1)? What are the roots of the problem? How much 
water is available? Is it fairly shared? Following which mechanisms?
To try to promote development of Water and Sanitation in Africa, the 
Global Water Operators’ Partnerships Alliance (GWOPA - United Nations 
Habitat) relies on the power of numbers. Their tool is the public display of 
utility performance also known as benchmarking. If performance is usually 
compared between individual cities, few initiatives have tried to monitor 
inequalities in the very heart of cities. The French Institute for Research in 
Africa (IFRA) attempted to answer to this challenge in this partnership pilot-
project with GWOPA by using a hybrid methodology of remote sensing, 
household survey and spatial analysis to map the variation of the operator’s 
1. Martin LEDANT, doctorant en géographie, Laboratoire « Les Afriques dans le Monde - LAM», 
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Map 1 – Piped Water Coverage (cf: illustrated notebook)
Les Cahiers d’Outre-Mer 
336
Map 2  – Average Cost of Water (cf: illustrated notebook)
performance inside the city of Nairobi. This study identifies different types 
of neighborhoods judging at how they look from space. Data collected on 
the field was then analyzed in order to check if these different types of places 
also had specific water and sanitation profiles (Ledant, 2011). This allowed 
seeing the general variations that exist from one type of place and another and 
drawing the following observations: 
64 % of the population of Nairobi has access to an individual tap or a 
yard tap as their main source of water. In reality, some neighborhoods have 
universal coverage while others barely have any at all. Between those two 
extremes, evidences show that the piped network can also be deficient in certain 
areas. A Nairobian living in a middle or higher income class neighbourhoods 
surely has a connection to the piped water network (coverage 85-95 %) even 
if some areas still experience problems. Another resident living in a lower 
income area might not have an individual tap and surely rely on other sources 
to access water (coverage: 70 %). Finally, they are those (mostly in the slums) 
for which having a tap is a luxury (coverage: 12 %) and who entirely depend 
on other sources. This striking figure really shows the level of neglect which 
characterises these areas.
Households which cannot access water with a metered Nairobi City 
Water & Sewerage Company Limited (NCWSC) connection at the Increasing 
Block Tariff (IBT: subsidized rate of 18.71 Kenyan shillings (KES) for each 
of the 10 first cubic meters, then increase by block up to a maximum of 53.80 
KES per cubic meter), must rely on alternative suppliers. These are much 
more expensive in Nairobi: water kiosks tariff fluctuate around 400 KES/m3, 
handcarts around 1 000 KES/ m3 and tankers and private boreholes are even 
more costly alternatives. Hence, the result of unreliability and inaccessibility 
of Water Supply service is the inflation of the cost of water. The higher and 
middle income areas usually pay the regulated NCWSC tariff although reliance 
on tankers and private boreholes exists. In the low-income neighbourhoods, 
many households are not connected. And those who are seem to experience 
unsatisfactory service because they also use alternative water suppliers, 
particularly handcarts. As a result average cost of water reaches up to ten times 
the lifeline NCWSC tariff. In the very-low income areas (i.e. the slums and old 
colonial African quarters), water delivery is almost entirely provided by water 
kiosks which tend to hike the price up to 25 times the subsidized rate despite 
the fact NCWSC operate a special rate for water kiosk (Map 2).
Map 3 – Average Daily Consumption of Water Per Capita (cf: illustrated 
notebook)
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As a result, consumption patterns also show striking disparities (Map 3).
Residents of the better-off neighbourhoods tend to consume 200 to 300 
litres of water per day per capita (lpcd), whereas, a slum dweller will only 
use 15 lpcd. Between these extremes, a middle class customer generally 
consumes a comfortable quantity of water (130 lpcd), but the rest of the city 
dwellers have to deal with an average less than the equivalent 20 to 30 lpcd, 
although differences exists between connected households which consume 
more (up to 50 lpcd) than others. Different households with different life-
style, and different access to water, have different water needs.  Hence, it is 
“normal” that water supply is designed in a way that provides more water to 
certain than others. However in Nairobi, the better off consume more than 
designed for and the poor are delivered less than their designed level. 40% 
of the distributed water is supplied to the 7% biggest consumers and the 45% 
smallest consumers share 15% of water available. In other terms it seems that 
in Nairobi, the wealthy have such a demand that it creates a water shortage of 
which the cost is mainly born by the less privileged people. (Fig. 1)
Behind this situation are several causes, each of them is part of a complex 
system of interactions of technical, economic and political factors. We will 
however try to synthetize and investigate various hypotheses individually to 
try to see the underlying causes and possible solutions.
Is water problem purely an urban growth problem (map 4)? For sure, the 
speed Nairobi grows – one of the highest rates experienced worldwide – is at 
the core of this issue. In a hundred years a simple colonial railway depot has 
turned into to a three million metropolis. The population, doubling in size on 
Figure 1 – Cumulative proportion of water consumed
Les Cahiers d’Outre-Mer 
338
Map 4 – Residential Typology (cf: illustrated notebook)
average every 15 years, has put tremendous pressure on WS infrastructure 
which cannot keep pace (Government of Kenya, 2009). These strains are 
acerbated by the underlying socio-economical segregation of the city. Over 
independence, colonial segregation has changed name but has mutated into a 
socio-economical segmentation. Structurally, the lifestyle and privileges of the 
wealthy, occupying the upper forested areas, jeopardize the water resources 
of other less privileged classes, living in the lower areas. Locally, the urban 
planning standards required for operating a water network efficiently are rarely 
met. Enforcement of building by-law is weak and informality is endemic to 
all neighborhoods of Nairobi and epitomized by its numerous slums or what 
Huchzermeyer (2007) called the “tenements cities”. Once informality has 
settled, upgrading informal areas is more costly than building from scratch 
(Baross et al., 1990). In other words, although it does not explain it all: fast 
growth, colonial heritage, and lack of formal urban planning constitute a 
ground on which inequality can prosper.
Could the water supply be expanded to bring more water to the city? 
Nairobi is situated relatively high, at the top of a small tributary basin of the 
Athi River with small amount of water harvestable locally. Accordingly, since 
Nairobi creation, the struggle has been constant to expend the water supply to 
always more distant river basins, in greater proportions and at greater pace in 
track with the fast growing demand of the metropolis (Nilsson, 2011). Despite 
three consecutive large scale water supply projects completed in 1995 (total 
design capacity of supply: 524,800 m3/day) (World Bank, 1996), demand in 
Nairobi has already outstripped supply sometimes around 2007. Hence Nairobi 
is in a situation of structural water shortage likely to worsen until further 
expansion. This fact has tremendous implications on all the other aspects of 
water management, especially on the fact that water has to be rationed. Today, 
another major expansion of the system is needed without which water situation 
in Nairobi will deteriorate further. The “Northern Collector” is presently being 
designed and should gradually bring the total raw water supply up to 1,3 Mm3/
day by 2035 (Njoroge, 2011). This might bring relief to Nairobi’s population 
in the short term. But as population keeps on growing exponentially, supplies 
will have to follow the same trend in finding always larger water resources at 
always greater pace in always more remote locations. In a place like Eastern 
Africa, where water isn’t abundant, a strategy based on supply expansion is 
simply unsustainable. (Fig. 2)
How does the utility plan for the demand of its customers? Are the poor 
considered? Calculations made at the planning stage for new supply accounts 
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for increase in population projections and the varying needs of different 
customer profiles. Since Independence, high-income earners have always 
been allowed large volume of water (250 lpcd) whereas the lower income, 
assumed to be disconnected from the network never more than 20 lpcd 
(WHO recommends 40 lpcd for basic needs) (Nilsson, 2011).  This allocation 
pattern, formalized in an official manual Warrant/Investment (MWI) manual, 
represents a certain unequal reality of past consumption patterns (EGIS, 
2011). Nevertheless, if its appropriateness is not discussed, it may perpetuate 
an unequal situation and lock up an entire group into ‘designed’ inequality. 
However, the consultant in charge of the Northern Collector has taken the 
initiative to increase the allocation of the poor to 30 lpcd while assuming that 
large parts of this population will connect to the network in the near future and 
be allowed 60 lpcd. In other words, the philosophy seems to change as plans 
now aim for a higher, hence closer to reality, design demand. It only remains 
for these assumptions to turn into reality (EGIS, 2011).
Is inequality taking its roots in an uneven configuration of the water 
network? Clearly, during colonial times, water supply and distribution 
network were mainly centered on the upper and wealthier areas through 
Kabete reservoir (East Africa Royal Commission, 1955; van Zwanenberg et 
al. 1975). However, the most recent upgrade of the network concluded in 1995 
in collaboration with the World Bank were mainly meant to service the new 
rapidly expanding eastern parts of Nairobi. In fact, this upgrade really favored 
the eastern and more popular areas and large public housing schemes were 
developed with pre-existing WS infrastructure. In addition, 85% of the water 
supply is now channeled directly to the lower areas through Gigiri Reservoir 
which is a hundred meter lower in altitude than Kabete (World Bank, 1996, 
African Development Bank, 1998). In truth, it favors the lower areas so much 
that the operator struggles to pump up enough water to feed the very-high 
demand of the high income earners living on the hills. The apparent inequality 
Figure 2 – Water Demand and Water Supply (1906-2006)
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of service in Nairobi is hence not fed by the general configuration of the 
network. However, the first upgrade of the upcoming Nairobi Water Supply 
IV (WS IV) will be to double up the pumping capacity which shows the 
willingness to rebalance the flow of water towards the wealthier areas.
Is the operator deliberately giving more water to some parts of the city? 
Water allocation in Nairobi is operated at the global city-level through “the 
corridors” and at the local level through “the regions” along with billing, 
customer care and technical assistance. The city-level rationing reveals the 
only obvious instance of rationing favoring a specific income group (Personal 
Interviews). Out of the four corridors dividing the city only one is never closed: 
the corridor supplying the upper and wealthier area. This can be justified by 
the fact that the wealthy have higher consumption habits, but is it fair when 
the poor barely have the minimum water quantity needed for domestic use 
according to World Health Organization standards (WHO/SEARO, undated)? 
The three other corridors servicing the lower area are rationed nearly equally 
which means their valves are turned open for the same period of time. 
However, to fairly allocate the water coming from the corridors down at the 
neighborhood scale, the operator requires the technical capacity on top of the 
political or commercial will. Equitable rationing of available water should 
consider areas’ needs, their capacity to store water, and population density. 
Beyond proper planning, the operator requires a convenient and efficient 
network. Different pressure zone must be well separated along with bulk 
meters and valves designed in the right locations.
Does the operator have the capacity to operate a fair share of the available 
water? Despite the general configuration of the network which might favor 
the lower area, the utility recognizes that the network is dysfunctional and 
does not allow operating an intermittent water supply efficiently (AWSB, 
2010).  Without this system, households are left to their own capacity, chances 
and self-interest when it comes to harvesting to available water. Physical, 
socio-economical and geographical disparities of Nairobi are free to emerge: 
denser neighborhoods (map 5) must share the pressure with a greater number 
of households. Amongst these households the ones which have invested in 
the greatest storage capacity will capture more, leaving the others with 
less pressure (Choe et al., 1997). Interestingly, it is often the slums which 
beneficiate from the remnant pressure in the pipes once they are closed. 
Indeed, these settlements are often located near river in depression where 
pressure is at its peak. Despite this, it seems that this water is most often 
sold to the neighboring better off quarters rather than consumed by the locals. 
Concerning the general configuration of the network, it is also known that 
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entire areas are located too far downstream of the network (east and south-
east) do receive less pressure (Personal Interviews).
Population densityWhy is so little done for the slums where live most of 
the people that remain to be connected? First of all, let us repeat that in the 
present supply situation, it cannot expand its services in new areas without 
compromising service everywhere else. This fact aside, there are also obstacles 
at the local level: the cost of getting connected can reach up to one year of 
water supply for a slum household. For structures owners, upgrading is very 
risky:  no legal status, no warranty that the slum will remain, and the costs 
associated with maintenance (Bakker et al., 2007). For the utility, installing 
and operating infrastructure comes at greater cost in slums than in formal 
areas. Investment is risky as land-tenure is unsecured and it is costly: public 
space left available is small, physical layout rarely complies with conventional 
technology, people must be moved and many stakeholders must be involved 
(Mukhija, 2001; Fernandez 2011a). In addition the cost of administrating 
such areas is much greater than in formally planned areas, with well planned, 
demarcated and identified plots (Personal Interviews). Basically, in the slums 
everything is more complicated financially, legally and technically. However, 
the existence of slums is a question which goes beyond access to water and 
sanitation and which involves lots of political and financial interests… or 
disinterest.
Is the water pricing efficient for regulating water demand? Some scholars 
have argued that the price of water should be put at its right value to promote 
an optimal use (Roger et al., 2002). In Nairobi, a “pro-poor” increasing Block 
Tariff (IBT) is in effect which allows the high-end consumers with higher 
purchasing power and more marginal use of water to subsidize the low-end 
customers with lower purchasing power and more vital water needs. However, 
in addition to the fact that most poor cannot access the IBT because of lack 
of metered connection, the IBT is actually too low, one of the lowest in 
Kenya in fact, to promote equity (Atkins, 2007). The last price rise, which 
came more than ten years after the last indexation, allowed the company not 
to fall below its operation and maintenance costs. And many evidence show 
that households are willing to pay more to access more water: they invest in 
storage capacity and pumps, and pay much more to the unregulated alternative 
suppliers. Pushing the price to a higher level could lower high-end customers 
demand and bring more water to the poor… but it requires political will and 
technical capacity.
Map 5 – Population Density (cf: illustrated notebook)
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Is the institutional setup favoring the development of a better water and 
sanitation sector? Certainly, in the mid-1990s, the Kenyan water sector was 
performing very poorly and had become completely unsustainable. However, 
by 2002 a new formal institutional framework was put in place through the 
Water Act to address this downward spiral of service delivery (Nilsson and 
Nyangeri, 2009 ; Government of Kenya, 2002 ; World Bank, 2011). The 
idea was to decentralise water management from the ministry and promote 
corporate governance and commercial orientation. Regulation was passed to 
the Water Services Regulatory Board (WASREB). Responsibility over service 
delivery and asset holding was passed to eight regional water services board 
(i.e. AWSB instead of Nairobi City County, NCC). The actual operations and 
maintenance of WS was contracted to a non-public commercial company 
(i.e. NCWSC instead NCC). Despite this new framework, doubts remain 
whether the spirit of the act has been translated into reality: first, both the 
water company and the assets remained in the hands of NCC (Global Credit 
Rating Co., 2008). Second, the City council drains 50% of the Board revenues 
as a lease fee although it does not maintain nor develop nor repay these assets 
and regardless the fact that the Board has carried out consequent investments 
in Sasumua Dam (Personal Interviews). According to WASREB (2010), 
National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) achieved an Operating 
Cost Coverage Ratio of 126% in 2010. This could be seen as good news if 
this did not open the question whether Nairobi Water Lease fee to the Board 
isn’t too low. Furthermore, Nairobi Water which holds 96 % of the Athi 
Water Services Board (AWSB)’s cash often carries out work of maintenance 
on the system under AWSB approval. However, for reasons due to time and 
work pressures these works are often carried out without express permission, 
resulting in disputes over payments (Global Credit Rating and Co., 2008). In 
other words, it seems that although the Act is pushing the sector towards better 
management practices, it mainly profits to the Operator and the Council but 
not to the Board nor to the necessary investments in water infrastructures.
Does the operator have incentives to promote equity in its services? 
Nairobi Water must operate on commercial basis. This means it has incentive 
to maximize profit by increasing sales (expanding coverage), increasing their 
revenue (lowering Non Revenue Water (NRW), increasing collection and 
metering efficiency, increasing the tariff) and reducing their operational and 
maintenance costs (by reducing staff). On the other side, AWSB has no financial 
incentives to improve the service, subsidies are not linked to performances and 
the lease fees defined in the tripartite agreement are not directly linked to capital 
investment. All in all this does not engender a conducive environment for the 
Board to carry on its job of improving the network (Personal Interviews). 
AWSB and NCWSC are on the other hand regulated by WASREB which 
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collects, analyses, rank and publish Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in a 
yearly report called IMPACT (WASREB, 2010). These reports are meant to 
“name and shame” the good and bad operators and are the strongest tools in the 
hand of the regulator since it has no financial means for reward and sanctions. 
In addition to the weakness of the tools in the hands of the Regulator, the 
selected KPIs mainly focus on commercial and operational efficiency. Very 
few impact directly on the poor, and those which do are given little attention in 
the weighting scheme. As a result it can be said that the regulatory framework 
although weak tends to reinforce the commercial orientation rather than 
providing a guard against its possible negative side effect such as less service 
to the poor. As for now, it seems that the poor appear in the reports only to 
clear the operators’ consciences and it is very unlikely in the current incentives 
framework that more will be done to promote equity through regulation.
Could tackling Non-Revenue Water be a good solution to bring more 
water to the less privileged? In Nairobi, the volume of water that is not billed 
to the customers because it physically leaked of because it was not metered is 
frighteningly high. The more optimistic estimate it at 40%: twice the yields 
of Sasumua and Ruiru dams combined gone unbilled every day (GWOPA, 
2012; IBNET, 2012; Karanja, 2011). NCWSC has officially embarked into a 
crusade to reduce drastically NRW. First through capacity building and better 
management tools: mapping the network and meters, computerized mobile 
billing, and expansion of the motorbike fleet of the meter-readers. Second 
through illegal connections reduction: by investing in the problematic areas 
and gaining control over alternative unregulated suppliers. Fewer illegal 
connections and fewer leaks should translate into more water at affordable 
price. But in practice on a day-to-day basis they are mainly two ways to reduce 
NRW in problematic areas: the first one is difficult, dangerous but necessary 
in the long run: it consists in gaining control over illegal connections and 
alternative suppliers through a lengthy battle against informality. The second 
one is easy, effective but unsustainable: it consists in shutting the pipes which 
supply problematic areas where the water spills the most. This practice, 
although not officially used is clearly an underlying principle of water 
distribution in Nairobi (Personal Interviews). And at this game, it is often the 
lower-income areas which loose since they commonly have more illegal, more 
physical leaks, and are less reliable clientele. NRW fighting can be a solution, 
notably to bring down the price for those who cannot access the subsidized 
rate. But only if it goes hand in hand with more service to the poor or it might 
instead mean no more water for them at all. 
Conclusions: is inequity of service in Nairobi planned for or there by 
default? Inequity of service can be explained by a variety of reasons: Some of 
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which the utility has little influence on: The tremendous uncontrolled growth 
of Nairobi and its various forms informality put pressure on infrastructures 
and inflate its operating costs. Nairobi historical context has seen a minority 
of wealthier people accumulating privileges. Increasing supply in line with 
booming demand is tricky: constructing dams is costly and requires time. 
However, for the first time the new up-coming supplies are designed in a way 
which considers the poor. Some for which it fails to take actions: By designing 
an efficient institutional framework which consider the right to water for 
all (and especially the poor), not only promote commercial orientation and 
operational efficiency. By proposing an efficient water demand management 
framework allowing the poor to get their share. By adopting a real pro-poor 
water tariff, which can lower the high consumers demand, discourage wasteful 
use of water and allows more water to be tapped to the poor. By making 
sure NRW reduction is translated into effective investments in problematic 
areas and not less water into these. By allocating available water equitably 
in a way which considers people’s needs, density and capacity to store water. 
Some which are openly discriminative: The configuration of the supply and 
distribution system favors the lower and more popular areas. The operator is 
constantly struggling to pump enough water to the never rationed upper and 
high consuming areas. The doubling of the pumping capacity from Gilgiri to 
Kabete is the first major upgrade of the system and is a clear priority. This 
clearly shows that despite recent change state of mind concerning the rights of 
the poor, servicing the wealthy which consume and pay more, and are more 
politically influent is still high in the agenda. 
Recommendations: how to promote more equity of service in Nairobi? 
By Operating a shift from the traditional “supply based” to a “demand 
based” management: Despite the traditional reliance on new supply to 
alleviate Nairobi water problems, once again translated in the nonetheless 
necessary Northern Collector, the water sector should learn to rely on demand 
management to tamper the negative effects of water shortages which will 
inevitably return as population and demand grow. Seeing the means which 
will be mobilized in this upcoming water project, planners should realize 
that another Northern Collector will soon become impossible. Sharpen the 
regulatory incentives for equity: The constitutional Right to Water is not yet 
translated into the regulatory framework. The Water Act undoubtedly allowed 
to improve the sector by promoting commercial and operational efficiency, 
it should nevertheless be amended to also promote equity. The regulator 
should  be given stronger ‘sticks and carrots’, notably by financial means 
and not uniquely by ‘naming and shaming’. Strengthen the ‘long route of 
accountability’: The WSBs are responsible for service delivery, although 
customers have barely any influence on them.  The board should be held 
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accountable to them by the promotion of tools bringing their voice up such 
as the Citizen Report Cards, Geo-Referenced Utility Benchmarking System 
(GRUBS) City-level or MajiData. Engage a debate on fair water pricing: 
Water price should be subject to a debate to increase the price for the biggest 
consumers in order to strengthen the cross-subsidies of the Increasing Block 
Tariff (IBT). Equity requires technological change and investments on the 
network: The network should be upgraded to allow efficient and equitable 
water allocation. Innovative financial and technological solutions should also 
be adopted to overcome the obstacles specific to problematic areas like the 
slums.
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Water and Sanitation in Nairobi face problem common to many cities of the developing 
world which grow too fast. This situation allows the stark differences in socio-
economic between the wealthy and the poor to translate into unequal and inequitable 
consumption of the available water. To try to promote development of Water and 
Sanitation in Africa, GWOPA (United Nations) and IFRA attempted to depict the 
inner urban inequities in terms of water consumption, water supply and water access. 
They used a hybrid methodology of remote-sensing classification, household survey 
and spatial analysis to map the variation of the operator’s performance inside the city 
of Nairobi. This study identifies different types of neighborhoods judging at how they 
look from space.
Keys Words: Water, Equity, mapping, Nairobi, Kenya
L’accès à l’eau à Nairobi : des inégalités socio-économiques et spatiales
La contribution présente les résultats d’un projet de recherche mené en partenariat 
entre l’Institut français de recherche (IFRA) de Nairobi et le Centre des Nations 
Unies pour les Établissements Humains (UN-Habitat). Elle s’intéresse aux inégalités 
d’accès à l’eau dans la ville de Nairobi. La croissance de la ville a été si rapide 
qu’elle a pris de court les autorités responsables de l’approvisionnement en eau 
potable et qu’elle a induit des inégalités socio-économiques et spatiales importantes. 
Utilisant une approche hybride mélangeant le traitement d’une image satellitaire, une 
enquête à l’échelle des ménages et les méthodes de l’analyse spatiale la contribution 
cartographie les nuances géographiques des performances de l’opérateur d’eau de 
la ville de Nairobi.





Article 3: Map 1 – Piped Water Coverage
Article 3: Map 2  – Average Cost of Water
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Article 3: Map 3  – Average Daily Consumption of Water Per Capita
Article 3: Map 4 – Residential Typology
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Article 3: Map 5 – Population Density
